Image placeholder

Recommandations relatives à la divulgation de la propriété réelle dans le cadre de l’ITIE en République démocratique du Congo

Alors que l’ITIE RDC se prépare à publier une feuille de route pour la divulgation des individus qui bénéficient du secteur extractif en RDC, NRGI a développé une liste de recommandations débattues lors d’un atelier avec le comité exécutif de l’ITIE RDC le 24 et 25 octobre 2016 à Kinshasa. La RDC est l’un des rares pays ayant déjà divulgué l’identité de propriétaires réels dans ses derniers rapports ITIE (2013 et 2014) et les efforts doivent continuer.

Ces recommandations, qui pourraient aussi être utiles à d’autres pays francophones travaillant sur la propriété réelle, exhortent l’ITIE RDC à prendre des mesures afin de lutter de manière effective contre les conflits d’intérêt et la fraude fiscale. Dans un contexte où encore trop peu des revenus des mines et du pétrole sont utilisés pour le bienfait de la population et où il est fréquent de voir l’entreprise d’Etat Gécamines vendre en toute opacité des actifs à des destinataires inconnus enregistrés dans des paradis fiscaux, améliorer la gouvernance du secteur extractif à travers une divulgation effective des propriétaires réelles des entreprises minières et pétrolières en RDC semble primordial.

Image placeholder

Préserver la base d’imposition en Afrique: étude régionale des défis posés par la détermination des prix de transfert dans le secteur minier

In English »

Le présent rapport évalue le développement et la mise en œuvre des règles de contrôle des prix de transfert dans le secteur minier dans différents pays et contextes. Comme l’illustrent les études de cas complétant ce volume, le Ghana, la Guinée, la Sierra Leone, la Tanzanie et la Zambie font face à plusieurs difficultés majeures dans l’application des règles sur les prix de transfert.

Image placeholder

Prix de transfert dans le secteur minier guinéen

Read this publication in English here.

La Guinée compte certains des plus précieux et importants gisements de minerai de fer et de bauxite au monde. Avec des réserves estimées à plus de 1,8 milliards de tonnes de minerai de fer, Simandou — dont l’exploitation n’a pas encore démarré — est le plus grand gisement du pays. En 2013, le secteur minier guinéen représentait plus de 28 % des recettes de l’Etat et environ 96 % des recettes d’exportation du pays . Le montant de l’évitement fiscal, en particulier la manipulation des prix de transfert, pratiqué par les entreprises minières en Guinée est difficile à quantifier mais les personnes interrogées s’accordent pour dire qu’il s’agit d’un problème majeur. Des réformes juridiques et administratives complètes doivent être adoptées de toute urgence si la Guinée souhaite lutter contre la manipulation des prix de transfert et préserver la part qui lui revient de la rente tirée de ses ressources minières.

Les prix de transfert correspondent aux prix déterminés dans le cadre de transactions entre des entités juridiques liées appartenant à une même entreprise multinationale. Ces échanges sont considérés comme des « transactions contrôlées », portant par exemple sur l’achat ou la vente de biens ou d’actifs incorporels, la fourniture de services ou de financements, la répartition ou le partage des coûts. Tant que le prix fixé correspond au prix de pleine concurrence, c’est-à-dire à celui d’une transaction similaire entre deux parties indépendantes, aucun problème ne se pose. Toutefois, la détermination des prix de transfert peut prendre un caractère abusif lorsque des parties liées cherchent à fausser le prix pour diminuer le montant global de l’impôt dont elles sont redevables. Dans ce cas, cette pratique est généralement qualifiée de « manipulation du prix de transfert ».

La présente étude de cas examine les obstacles à la mise en œuvre de règles en matière de prix de transfert dans le secteur minier en Guinée. Les conclusions de cette étude forment une série de recommandations proposant des mesures pratiques pour améliorer le contrôle des prix de transfert dans le secteur minier. Ces recommandations peuvent être classées en quatre grandes catégories : cadre juridique des prix de transfert, dispositions administratives, informations sur les prix de transfert, et connaissances et compétences.

Image placeholder

Preventing Tax Base Erosion in Africa: A Regional Study of Transfer Pricing Challenges in the Mining Sector

En Français »

The commodity downturn represents an opportunity to invest in good practices that will help countries break from a legacy of inadequate governance and legal structures, weak enforcement of tax legislation and imprudent revenue management. Making improvements in establishing and enforcing strong governance and fiscal frameworks now to capture resource rents will also pay off when mineral prices rise again.

A critical area of reform is to counter aggressive tax planning and tax evasion. Tax planning, or tax avoidance, is the use of legal methods to minimize the amount of income tax owed by multinational enterprises (MNEs). In the absence of rigorous controls, some MNEs also employ illegal methods to reduce their taxable income by knowingly and illegally misrepresenting their transactions. This is called tax evasion.

The Africa Progress Panel has identified crossborder transactions between related parties as a major threat to the tax base of African countries. One of the principal vectors of losses in these transactions is transfer pricing, which occurs when one company sells a good or service to another related company. Because these transactions are internal, they are not subject to ordinary market pricing and can be used by MNEs to shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions.

Many African countries have begun to put legal rules on the taxation of cross-border transactions in place. Most of these rules require taxpayers to price transactions between related parties as if they were taking place between unrelated parties. This “arm’s length principle” is at the core of most global standards on controlling transfer pricing, led by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). However, compliance with the letter and the spirit of these rules depends on the administrative capacity of countries to actively enforce legislation. Preliminary results from research by the Institute for Mining for Development Centre suggest that out of 26 countries surveyed in Africa, most do not have the requisite capacity to implement effective transfer pricing rules.

This study assesses the development and implementation of rules to monitor transfer pricing in the mining sector in countries with varied experiences.

NRGI has also published case studies on transfer pricing in Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Zambia. Preventing Tax Base Erosion in Africa: A Regional Study of Transfer Pricing is available in French here

Listen to a podcast relating to this research:

Image placeholder

Direct Social Expenditures: A Monitoring Guide for Civil Society Organizations

This paper provides civil society organizations with different strategies to obtain and analyze detailed information on direct social expenditures (DSE) by companies. It also provides civil society with useful lessons on advancing the transparency agenda in this area.

The World Bank defines corporate social responsibility (CSR) as “companies’ commitment to contribute to sustainable economic development by working with employees, their families, the local community and society at large to improve their quality of life in a way that is beneficial for business and also for development.” Extractive industries engage in CSR because their activities are considered among the most environmentally and socially disruptive and it is critically important for them to secure their “social licenses to operate.”

As part of their CSR extractive companies invest significant amounts of resources to undertake social development programs; in 2001, oil, gas and mining companies disbursed more than $500 million in community development programs. These expenditures can have a large impact on small local economies. When poorly conceived and implemented, they can lead to corruption and undermine government authorities and institutions. In addition, these resources are obtained on the basis of concessions of oil, gas and minerals that belong to citizens. Companies receive fiscal concessions or incentives from the social activities undertaken in the countries where they operate. All these reasons make it imperative that civil society organizations monitor DSE to ensure they are spent effectively.

Companies can employ different mechanisms to disburse DSE. These could be a function of program objectives and other contextual factors. A company might implement different mechanisms in different countries. It could use public or private disbursement channels, or a combination of both. CSOs need to understand these mechanisms and their pros and cons in order to monitor them. The paper studies the experience of two CSOs—Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana (GPC) in Peru and Instituto Brasileiro de Análises Sociais e Econômicas (IBASE) in Brazil—that successfully made extractive companies disclose information on their expenditures and have since monitored and evaluated the impact of these expenditures. Both CSOs created transparency indices and performed social audits to rigorously assess and rank company performance and undertake evidence-based policy advocacy. GPC successfully obtained information from more than 30 companies on $900 billion worth of social expenditures, and IBASE convinced over 300 private companies to disclose their social audits. The paper also explores experiences of countries that have negotiated including direct social expenditures in the disclosure requirements of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).

Despite progress in companies disclosing relevant data in recent years, transparency of direct social expenditures is more the exception than the norm. Companies should improve their reporting by providing detailed information about the types of projects funded, the objective of such projects, the amounts disbursed, and the persons responsible for allocating these resources. Contracts that include social expenditure obligations should be available for public consumption.

Image placeholder

Five Steps to Disclosing Contracts and Licenses in EITI

Disclosing contracts and licenses is one of the most important steps that EITI implementing countries can take to promote more effective management of their extractive resources. Contract transparency promotes constructive relationships between citizens, companies and governments, which can reduce conflict and promote stability in the sector. It helps set realistic expectations about the terms of and timelines for extraction, which facilitates accurate government revenue collection and forecasting. The disclosure of contracts also provides enhanced opportunities for stakeholders to monitor adherence to obligations, which encourages all parties to act responsibly in project implementation.

Contract/license disclosure also enhances the utility of other EITI disclosures by providing context that facilitates the analysis and understanding of revenue flows and other data. For example, Section 4.1(e) of the EITI Standard requires the disclosure and, where possible, reconciliation of material social expenditures that are mandated by law or contract. Without contract disclosure, it is difficult to determine whether contractual social payment obligations even exist, let alone accurately collect and reconcile information on them.

The note begins by looking at how an MSG can start discussing contract and license disclosure, followed by how countries can approach defining the scope of disclosure. Next, we cover mechanisms for assembling and verifying documents and establishing public access to this information. Finally, the note outlines options for maximizing public education and outreach. Throughout the note, we base the discussion on lessons learned from the experiences of the growing number of countries that publish their extractive industry contracts and licenses.

Image placeholder

Guinée briefing parlementaire: Permettre au pays hôte de tirer la juste valeur de ses minéraux

Image placeholder

Guinée briefing parlementaire: Participation de l’état dans les secteurs pétrolier et minier

Image placeholder

Guinée briefing parlementaire: La transparence et le suivi des contrats

Image placeholder

Guinée briefing parlementaire: L’ITIE et le contrôle parlementaire