National Oil Company Profile: PDSVA
Highlights
- Oil and gas production in Venezuela, including PDVSA’s, has starkly declined since 2014. At current production rates and without further discoveries, PDVSA’s oil reserves will be depleted by 2034.
- Only 5 percent of PDVSA’s investment pipeline is likely to break even in a fast transition scenario. In the moderate transition scenario, 14 percent of PDVSA’s 2023 to 2032 investment pipeline does not break even.
- PDVSA provides extremely limited public information. It has not published annual reports or other documentation to improve transparency and corporate governance since 2016. This lack of accountability is reflected in the company’s limited acknowledgement of its transition risks.
- Despite heavily depending on oil for revenues, the current Venezuelan government has failed to recognize or mitigate the country’s economic risks, and PDVSA has made no impact assessment of the climate-related business risks it faces.
See the accompanying guide for definitions of all variables and explanations of the terms used. Sources are referenced with a number in parentheses, e.g., (1), and listed at the end of the profile together with the reference year. An explanation of the energy transition scenarios used is also at the end of the profile, preceding the references.
This profile was last updated in August 2024.
Key statistics
| Potential emissions from reserves (proved, 1P) (1) | 902 Mt CO₂e |
| Home country income level (2) | Not classified |
| Equitable phase-out responsibility (11) | By 2043 |
| Share of investment that does not break even in a moderate transition scenario (1, 19) | 14% |
| Government revenues from oil and gas at risk in a moderate transition scenario, as share of current oil and gas government revenue (8) | 82% |
| Current share of total government revenue from oil and gas (8) | Close to 100% |
Company governance
PDVSA is engaged in oil and gas exploration, production, refining and transport. It is a national oil company (NOC) fully owned by the Venezuelan government and operates production and exploration facilities in its home market.
Since 2023, PDVSA’s CEO has been Pedro Rafael Tellechea, who is also Minister of Petroleum (a common occurrence in Venezuela). PDVSA provides limited information on its current governance practices, and most information is over a decade old. The current governance system of Venezuela does not distinguish regulation and production, which are both concentrated in the Ministry of Petroleum–PDVSA common leadership.
PDVSA has the structure of a joint-stock company but is not listed on stock exchanges. The government is the sole owner of the company.
| Founded (24) | 1975 |
| Listed on exchange (5) | No |
| Employment (24) | 90,000 |
| OPEC member country (15) | Yes |
| International exploration and production operations (1, 5) | No |
| Subsidiaries (5) | 21 subsidiaries in 4 countries |
Ownership
| Government of Venezuela | 100% |
Source: (5)
Environmental, social and governance performance
PDVSA does not provide updated environmental, social and governance (ESG) information, and its ESG indicators are unavailable. Venezuela’s Resource Governance Index score (which measures the transparency and accountability of fossil fuel revenue management, value realization, and the quality of the wider enabling governance environment) is well below regional and global averages.
| Company | Country | ESG score (5) | Environmental score (5) | Social score (5) | Governance score (5) | Resource Governance Index score (15) |
| PDVSA | Venezuela | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | 33 |
| Ecopetrol | Colombia | 69 | 59 | 75 | 72 | 71 |
| Petrobras | Brazil | 75 | 62 | 90 | 68 | 71 |
| YPF | Argentina | 71 | 63 | 67 | 89 | 57 |
| Pemex | Mexico | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | 71 |
| Regional average | 72 | 61 | 77 | 76 | 59 | |
| Global average | 66 | 68 | 66 | 64 | 52 | |
Reserves and production
Venezuela’s reserves are the second largest in the world. Unfortunately, much of this is extra-heavy oil that trades under a significant discount to lighter crude types. Further, PDVSA’s oil production has declined since 2014 due to experienced managers and employees leaving the company following the death of Hugo Chávez and the start of the Maduro government (20). According to Rystad Energy, under most scenarios, this decline is not expected to reverse.
Sources: (1, 3, NRGI visualization)
| Refining capacity (bpd) (13) | 749,000 |
| Pipeline capacity (bpd) (14) | 8,969,985 |
| Oil reserves of NOC (proved, 1P) (million boe) (1) | 2,603 |
| Oil reserves of NOC as share of reserves of country (1) | 71% |
| Years of oil reserves left at current production (1) | N/A |
| Gas reserves of NOC (million boe) (1) | 930 |
| Gas reserves of NOC / reserves of country (1) | 62% |
| Years of gas reserves left at current production (1) | N/A |
| NOC share in the country’s total oil production (3) | 81% |
| NOC share in the country’s total gas production (3) | 72% |
| NOC ownership share of the country’s oil reserves (3) | 71% |
Sources: (1, 3, NRGI visualization)
Transition and other economic risks
Venezuela’s government revenues are completely dependent on oil and gas, and 85 percent of such oil and gas revenues are at risk in the moderate transition scenario. Crude oil exports constitute most of the country’s exports.
As of August 2024, both Venezuela and PDVSA are in a dire financial position, which the withdrawal of credit rating agencies from its assessment reflects. PDVSA has not regularly disclosed its financial performance since 2014.
Economic dependence on fossil fuel revenues and exports
| Indicator | 2013–2017 | 2018–2022 |
| NOC transfers to government / total fiscal revenue (3, 1) | 14% | N/A |
| Crude oil export revenues / country’s export revenues (17, 19) | 85% | N/A |
| Gas export revenues / country’s export revenues (17, 19) | N/A | N/A |
Government revenues at risk in the transition
| Share of oil and gas revenue in total government revenue (8) | Government revenues from oil and gas at risk in a moderate transition scenario, as share of current oil and gas government revenue (8) | |
| Venezuela | 100% | 85% |
| Suriname | 11% | 1% |
| Colombia | 5% | 83% |
| Mexico | 7% | 90% |
| Regional median | 27% | 70% |
| Global median | 44% | 56% |
Credit ratings
| Fitch (5) | Moody’s (5) | S&P (5) | |
| Venezuela | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| PDVSA | N/A | N/A | N/A |
PDVSA financial performance
| Company | Country | Liquidity: current ratio (1, 3) | Efficiency and profits: return on capital employed (1, 3) | Indebtedness: leverage (1, 3) |
| PDVSA | Venezuela | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Petrobras | Brazil | 39% | 13% | 51% |
| Pemex | Mexico | 10% | 17% | 161% |
| Regional median | 22% | 19% | 44% | |
| Global median | 33% | 14% | 30% | |
Investment at risk in different energy transition scenarios
Source: (19)
In the moderate transition scenario, 14 percent of PDVSA’s 2023 to 2032 investment pipeline does not break even.
PDVSA has not planned for or acknowledged the financial risks for oil and gas resulting from the global energy transition (12).
From the 2000s, PDVSA developed some initiatives to diversify its portfolio, for example, through PDVSA Industrial and PDVSA Agricola, which focus on refining, petrochemicals and agriculture. However, nationally, there has been no substantial economic diversification.
Sources: (12, 13, 14)
Energy security
Venezuela is self-sufficient in oil; however, it has only 10 years left of reserves at current rates of production. It does not need to import gas. Despite the country’s economic reliance on oil, its power system relies on renewables, particularly hydropower, for 78 percent of its electricity generation (4). PDVSA also produces and refines most of the oil and gas Venezuelans use.
| Refining throughput of NOC as share of final country consumption of oil products (6) | 72% |
| Years of oil reserves left at current production (1) | 10 |
| Years of gas reserves left at current production (1) | N/A |
| Crude oil and refined oil products imports as share of national consumption of oil products (4) | N/A |
| Share of oil and gas in primary energy consumption of country (4) | 58% |
| Gas imports as share of country supply of gas (4) | 0% |
| Share of electricity production of country from renewables (4) | 78% |
Climate impacts and greenhouse gas emissions
PDVSA has extremely high scope 1 and 2 emissions per barrel. Furthermore, the company does not participate in the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative (OGCI). Its potential emissions from proven reserves are high. The NOC has also failed to set targets to reduce its scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions.
| NOC emissions reduction target, scope 3 emissions (21) | N/A |
| Annual scope 1 and 2 emissions of NOC (3) | N/A |
| Average GHG emitted before combustion per barrel of oil produced in country (9) | 259 kg CO₂e/boe |
| Average GHG emitted before combustion per boe of gas produced in country (9) | 243 kg CO₂e/boe |
| NOC is OGDC member (10) | No |
| NOC net zero target, scope 1 and 2 emissions (5) | N/A |
| Total potential emissions (scope 1–3) from reserves (1, 9) | 902 Mt CO₂e |
| NZE overshoot of resources under development (18) | 68% |
| Equitable phase-out responsibility of the country (11) | 2043 |
Energy transition scenarios
We use four energy transition scenarios:
Fast. We based this scenario on the oil and gas demand estimated in the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) Net Zero Emissions (NZE) by 2050 Scenario, which maps out a transition pathway that would limit global warming to 1.5°C. This assumes large-scale negative emissions enabled by technologies such as carbon capture and storage.
Moderate. We based this scenario on the IEA’s Announced Pledges Scenario (APS), which assumes the full and timely implementation of national energy and climate goals, including net zero emissions targets.
Slow. We based this scenario on the IEA’s Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS), which assumes governments follow their current set of energy and climate policies.
Expansion. We based this scenario on the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ (OPEC) scenario, which assumes a continued expansion in demand up to 2045.
Sources
All data are from the latest year available as referenced in the relevant source as of August 2024. For most data this is 2024. Data related to emissions and NOC finances are from 2023 or in some cases 2022. Data on country-level oil reserves and production, the ownership of oil reserves, employment and energy security are from 2022. The Resource Governance Index score is from 2021. If you find an error in this profile, please email noc_profiles@resourcegovernance.org.
- Rystad Energy UCube, 2024 (proprietary data)
- World Bank, 2024
- NOC Database, 2023
- International Energy Agency (IEA), 2023
- S&P Global IQ, 2024 (proprietary data)
- Statistical Review of World Energy, 2024
- Euromonitor, 2023
- Carbon Tracker, 2023
- Fossil Fuel Registry, 2023
- Oil & Gas Decarbonization Charter (OGDC), 2024
- An Equitable Phase Out of Fossil Fuel Extraction (Equity Review), 2023
- Facing the Future (NRGI), 2023
- World Benchmarking Alliance, 2023
- U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2024
- Resource Governance Index (NRGI), 2021
- OPEC, 2024
- UN Comtrade, 2024
- Global Oil & Gas Exit List, 2024
- Riskier Bets, Smaller Pockets (NRGI), 2023
- Hernández and Monaldi, 2016
- World Benchmarking Alliance, 2023
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