The Consolidated Mining Standard Initiative Must Dig Deeper

Four mining industry associations— The Copper Mark, ICMM, Mining Association of Canada (MAC) and World Gold Council (WGC)—are consolidating their different voluntary responsible mining standards into one global standard, the Consolidated Mining Standard Initiative (CMSI). They aim to produce a standard that verifies practices at the level of facilities, such as mines or smelters, and that end users can ultimately use to identify responsibly mined materials.

While the stated goals of the CMSI—to reduce complexity and clarify responsible practices—are laudable, many civil society actors have expressed skepticism after reviewing the draft documents released for the October-December 2024 public consultation on the CMSI. Some question why a new standard is needed given that a strong, independent, facility-level standard already exists in the form of IRMA, the Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance. Some are concerned that the CMSI could be a power grab by the industry associations—a way to preempt governments and international bodies which seek to establish rules to minimize the harms associated with the race to renewables, for which minerals and metals are critical inputs. 

Given the reach and influence of the four partnering industry associations, everyone interested in responsible mining must take the CMSI seriously. The partner associations anticipate that the CMSI could be used by as many as 100 mining companies across approximately 600 facilities in around 60 countries. What is more, policy developments in some jurisdictions may further boost the potential influence of standards like the CMSI. Most notably, the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) specifies that companies can use certification schemes that meet the EU’s criteria to verify compliance with sustainability standards for strategic projects involving critical raw materials, particularly those sourced outside the EU.

NRGI’s own analysis of the CSMI points to four key areas where the standard must be improved if it is to contribute positively to the sector. These comments are based on inputs from NRGI colleagues working in over a dozen mineral-producing countries. They also build on the recent NRGI publication Behind the Schemes which identifies gaps in the ways that many existing mining sector certification schemes—including those of The Copper Mark, ICMM and the Mining Association of Canada (MAC)—address corruption.

1.  The CMSI’s performance framework needs significant adjustment to ensure credibility.

The draft CMSI presents requirements under three levels of performance: “foundational”, “good” and “leading.” While a gradual framework like this can present companies with a pathway to drive improved performance over time, the requirements at each level currently need careful adjustment:

• Many of the foundational level requirements are currently so low that they risk undermining the whole standard, particularly given that the current draft standard allows companies to still claim that they are in alignment with the standard even if they only meet foundational practice in some areas. Framers of the CMSI should strongly reconsider the foundational practice requirements or remove the level altogether.
• The good practice level should be renamed if it is to remain the level that is in line with industry standards and international norms, frameworks and guidelines. “Satisfactory practice” would be more appropriate. Furthermore, many requirements at this level currently fall short of existing standards including on contract transparency, payments to government, responsible taxation, and anticorruption. To demonstrate that this level aligns with the standards it claims to, the CMSI must publish an equivalency mapping ahead of the second consultation showing which existing standards, frameworks and guidelines have been considered and how they have been incorporated.
• The leading practice level should be called “good practice”; so many companies already demonstrate the constituent elements that the current title is inaccurate. True leading practice is about pushing past existing horizons and is a level beyond what can be contained in a written standard.
• Finally, there are problems with the way that international law relating to human rights, child labor, slavery, Indigenous peoples and corruption is represented among the three practice levels. Full compliance with local and international laws must be a foundational practice.

NRGI’s specific comments on the CMSI requirements are available in this document.

2. The CMSI needs a standard approach for instances where the standard’s requirements are prohibited by local laws. 

There may be limited instances where facilities will not be able to meet certain CMSI requirements because they are prohibited to do so by local laws. For example, certain disclosures may be prohibited under confidentiality laws. In these instances, the standard should consistently 1) prevent companies from incorrectly claiming that local laws prohibit CMSI implementation, and 2) help host country jurisdictions improve and align their legal frameworks with international standards. To do this, the standard should compel companies to first identify and publish the specific legal text that prohibits compliance in the published assurance report; and second, notify the government that its legal framework is not in line with the CMSI.

3. The CMSI should set high thresholds for companies to make performance claims.

Much of the CMSI’s credibility will rest on how easy it is for companies to say that they meet the performance requirements of the CMSI. While there is a danger in setting this threshold so high that it acts as a deterrent to uptake and implementation, there is greater risk that the threshold is set so low that CMSI claims do not convey meaningful information about company practice. The policy should require facilities to meet all of the good practice requirements to make a performance claim. Requiring anything less than 100 percent adherence would mean that not all performance claims are equal, leaving uncertainty as to whether specific performance criteria have been met (e.g., child labor or human rights), and ultimately making the performance claim less meaningful. One alternative might be to identify core good practice requirements that must be met as part of a performance claim. However, this approach would add further complexity to the standard, and it may not be possible to reach consensus about which requirements should be excluded. The best option is to require facilities to meet all of the good practice requirements to make a performance claim.

4. The CMSI needs a robust multistakeholder governance model to remain relevant in the long term.

True multistakeholder governance would provide channels for different stakeholders to scrutinize and guide the development and application of the CMSI over time, allowing the CMSI to self-correct and evolve as problems are discovered, as circumstances change and as responsible mining practices evolve. Multistakeholder governance is also a requirement for any certification scheme to be recognized by the EU under the Critical Raw Materials Act.

The proposed governance structure, which specifies participation of different interests in the CMSI board and committees, ensures some level of diversity but falls short of true multistakeholder governance. As the EU Critical Raw Materials Act outlines, multistakeholder governance requires a mandate “which confirms or supports the involvement of the multi-stakeholder representatives of that certification scheme”. The proposed CMSI governance model falls short in four ways:

• Stakeholder groups are not able to select their own representatives. Rather, the choice of board and committee representatives is for the chair to decide in consultation with the Stakeholder Advisory Group and the Industry Advisory Group. This raises the possibility that representatives could be seen as illegitimate by the groups they represent.
• There is no process for how different board members should engage and consult with their constituencies. This is critical to ensure that individuals and groups outside of the formal governance structures of the CMSI have their interests and perspectives heard in CMSI policy processes. A straightforward fix would be to require and resource different stakeholder groups to develop their own constituency processes.
• The governance structure does not present any way of addressing the clear asymmetries of power that will be present in the proposed policy bodies. This presents the danger that powerful and well-resourced groups such as multinational companies are able to steamroll decisions, reducing the participation of less-resourced groups to window dressing. The CMSI should support stakeholder groups to develop their own coordination and support structures to ensure that constituency representatives are sufficiently prepared to engage in CMSI decision making processes.
• Some important stakeholder groups are missing from the proposed structure. A role for civil society is necessary for the CMSI to meet the EU definition of multistakeholder governance under the Critical Raw Materials Act, yet the governance model does not use the term civil society. Instead, it only mentions some of civil society’s constituent members under mining and value chain stakeholders. The CMSI must specify a role for civil society as a whole. Another important omission is governments, who are uniquely positioned to help mining companies meet the requirements of the CMSI.

NRGI’s specific comments on the CMSI governance model are available in this document.