The growing Mexican dependence on gas, particularly that originating from the United States, today represents one of the most pressing challenges to the country’s energy security.  

Gas supplies most of the electricity generation and is an essential input for industry and Pemex. This centrality has been built on a growing dependence on imports from the United States. The deepening of this dependence has exacerbated the country’s energy vulnerabilities, making it more susceptible to adverse conditions.  

This discussion paper examines the assumptions that have guided energy policy around gas in light of emerging risks in an increasingly dynamic and uncertain context. The risks identified are grouped into three main categories: supply risks, economic risks, and environmental and climate risks.  

This analysis seeks to contribute to a more informed and realistic debate on the role of gas in Mexico, helping to move beyond the polarized positions that currently prevail. It offers a pragmatic, evidence-based approach that recognizes the complexities of today’s energy system while also identifying the limits and conditions for the future use of gas.  

To advance in this direction, four key priorities are identified:  

1. Adopt a comprehensive risk assessment framework for gas.  
2. Advance an orderly and coherent energy transition that harmonizes the role of gas with renewable energies
3. Develop a gas demand management policy.  
4. Strengthen capacities for measuring, monitoring, reporting, and verifying methane emissions.  

Mexico has the legal framework, technical capacities, and institutional tools necessary to reduce its structural dependence on gas and mitigate the risks that derive from it. Strategically leveraging these capacities will be essential to ensure a reliable, affordable, and sustainable energy supply in the coming decades.   

As the ink was drying on the recent Ukraine-United States agreement, questions quickly arose: could this approach, which puts mineral resources at the heart of security diplomacy, serve as a model for mineral producing countries in Africa and beyond? Today’s announcement of a U.S.-brokered agreement around the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) with Rwandan-backed rebels raises the possibility of a frequently mentioned linked U.S. minerals deal being a next step, making it timely to consider implications of the Ukraine deal elsewhere.

With the Trump administration having set the tone by aggressively linking U.S. diplomacy to commercial and geopolitical mineral competition, a wave of state-to-state mining agreements may well be coming—with some focused on the minerals-security nexus.  

Some governments and stakeholders in mineral-producing countries may view these new deals with trepidation, not least given the intense diplomatic pressure pushing them to the negotiating table, the role minerals have long played in conflicts and some negative experiences with somewhat analogous resource-for-infrastructure deals in past decades. Others may welcome a novel structure to support their broader security or development ambitions. Regardless of their orientation, lessons from Ukraine's newly signed deal and earlier African country experiences can help governments navigate this environment of deal-making in the pressure cooker of the current geopolitical moment.

Choices made by Ukraine and other countries in the context of war and an urgent need for international support should be understood accordingly. Still, governments have important lessons to draw upon, including around the importance of transparency, the need to look beyond rhetoric to the concrete lasting obligations, the challenges of valuing mineral resources and what’s received in return, and how to advance long-term objectives while prioritizing short-term security needs.

Transparency is essential

The frequent lack of public information about state-to-state mineral partnerships often makes them difficult to scrutinize. As with mining contracts generally, transparency—including around the parties involved and responsible for implementation—is essential to building public trust, deterring corruption and helping ensure fair returns to a country’s citizens.

In this sense, it is noteworthy that one of the main agreements constituting the Ukraine-U.S. deal was published by the Ukrainian government (though not simultaneously by the U.S. government) and approved by the Ukrainian legislature. This publication at least allows stakeholders to probe some of the details around two main features of the deal, namely (i) a joint investment fund for the reconstruction of Ukraine using, in part, Ukrainian government resource revenues, and (ii) commitments by the Ukrainian government to the U.S. regarding investment opportunities and offtake rights in future resource projects in Ukraine.

However, some key terms—namely those detailing contributions and withdrawals from the fund, are not set out in the published agreement, but in a separate “LP agreement,” reportedly signed weeks later, which has not been disclosed. Without transparency of the full deal documentation, stakeholders cannot have a full understanding of the deal.

African experience with resource-backed loans or resource-for-infrastructure arrangements reinforces the importance of transparency. Like today’s mineral-security deals, those deals involved mineral-producing countries using their natural resources to achieve largely unrelated benefits (e.g., financing for infrastructure in exchange for future natural resources) and often involved a global power government. For example, transparency concerns have plagued multiple stages of the DRC-China Sicomines deal, from the initial agreement to a 2017 amendment, the latest 2024 renegotiation and its ongoing implementation.

Civil society organizations in the DRC have raised concerns that a potential U.S. mineral deal risks repeating the opacity that characterized the Sicomines deal. The fact that the Congolese public apparently first learned of the potential deal with the U.S. through American media rather than their own government underscores this concern. On the other hand, the DRC government has recently published the names of the team coordinating the U.S. negotiations, aiming to reinforce public trust and preempt potential corruption concerns. The government should continue to prioritize transparency, particularly in any next step economic negotiations, allowing the public to have a better understanding of the DRC's expectations in this process.

Rhetoric doesn’t always match reality…

Transparency is important in part because with complex arrangements such as mineral partnership agreements, the devil is in the details. In negotiating or evaluating a deal, producer-country governments and stakeholders —such as civil society and parliamentarians— must look beyond the rhetoric to understand the actual terms and lasting obligations.

For example, media coverage of the Ukraine-U.S. agreement, has focused on U.S. preferential access to Ukrainian minerals and Ukraine avoiding an obligation to repay earlier U.S. for earlier military assistance. But in each of these cases, the actual terms of the agreement provide less certainty than the political rhetoric suggests.

On U.S. access to Ukrainian minerals, the White House fact sheet suggests that future natural resource projects in Ukraine are there for the U.S.’s taking: “If the United States decides to acquire these resources for ourselves, we will (sic) given first choice to either acquire them or designate the purchaser of our choice.” In practice, Ukraine achieved agreement terms that are more nuanced, clarifying that any preferential offtake terms apply only to certain resource projects and would need to be negotiated based on “market-based commercial terms.” And while the agreement mentions “certain restrictions” on offtake by others (to be detailed in the LP Agreement), the published agreement does not mention a U.S. right to designate a purchaser.

On Ukraine not repaying the U.S., this is, strictly speaking, accurate and an improvement for Ukraine from earlier Trump administration positions. However, the only specified financial commitment from either party in the published agreement is Ukraine contributing “Ukraine Agreed Revenues” (i.e., 50 percent of royalties, fees, etc. from certain resource projects) into a fund reported jointly and equally owned by the Ukraine and the U.S.. And while some sources reference the US also making financial contributions into the fund, the published agreement includes no such commitment.

Furthermore, mention in the published agreement of future military assistance counting as an “increase” in the U.S. contribution could be interpreted (unless otherwise addressed in the LP agreement) as the U.S. having already contributed to the fund. In such an interpretation, the agreement’s provisions could be viewed as a sort of conversion of “debt” (for prior U.S. military support) into “equity” for the US in the fund. Nevertheless, the narrative that Ukraine owes no repayment to the U.S. has prevailed. Ultimately the real balance seems to depend on (i) the eventual significance of the “Ukraine Agreed Revenues” and (ii) the eventual rules around withdrawal of money from the fund and any further commitments to contribute into the fund, which were to be set out in the separate undisclosed LP Agreement.

…but perceptions matter too

While analyzing deal terms is essential, the Ukraine experience shows that it is not only hard contractual obligations that matter. Even if the deal is, as some commentators have noted, unlikely to lead to significant resources or revenues changing hands anytime soon, signing it does appear to have contributed to changing the dynamic between the U.S. and Ukraine.

It has relieved pressure on Ukraine from the Trump administration and opened the door to further U.S. diplomatic support, putting the possibility of additional US military assistance back on the table for the first time under this administration. In that sense, the deal has perhaps already helped Ukraine achieve some of its short-term objectives with a U.S. administration eager to tout “deals,” even if future U.S.-Ukraine relations remain uncertain in a volatile geopolitical context. As African governments weigh the pros and cons of similar deals, these relationship considerations will certainly be a factor driving decision amidst imperfect choices.

More broadly, the Ukraine deal shows that even in power imbalances, it is possible to improve terms through negotiations. Ukrainian officials were able to at least partly resist pressure and improve the deal terms from the earlier White House proposals with apparently significantly worse terms for Ukraine, though this also depends on the terms of the undisclosed LP agreement.

Governments need to rigorously assess the value of mineral resources and what is offered in return

Fairly valuing mineral resources is always challenging in mining deals due to uncertainty around geology, prices and costs. For the Ukraine agreement, estimating the value of the “Ukraine Agreed Revenues” comes with its own challenges, but using data from Ukraine’s EITI reports on previous government resource revenues and various scenarios on the value of Ukraine’s mineral resources, while not foolproof, could help.

The valuation challenge is even greater in mineral-for-security or resource-for-infrastructure deals when assessing what is received in return for minerals. For example, the Sicomines deal has been criticized for trading significant mineral wealth for inadequate roads and poor equipment.

Security deals add further complexity because military and diplomatic assistance are often opaque and harder to value. The valuation needs to also account for the impact of such assistance. For example, while a deal between Kinshasa, Kigali and Washington could potentially address the conflict with the Rwandan-backed M23 rebels, valuing that security assistance and its impact on human rights and the economy, including on the mining sector—is difficult given there are more than 140 armed groups active in Eastern Congo.

In mineral security arrangements, a key potential benefit for producer countries, be it Ukraine or DRC, is the promotion of future resource-sector investment. But in practice achieving this often goes well beyond what is covered in the agreement. For example in Ukraine, the significant private sector investment required is unlikely until the conflict ends, especially as an estimated half of the country’s mineral wealth is currently under Russian occupation.

In the DRC, besides the security context, other challenges hindering Western mining investment include: lack of sufficient energy and transport infrastructure, a difficult business environment and Chinese market dominance. Many known deposits have already been ceded to foreign companies, limiting the DRC government’s options. Also, lack of certified geological data in certain areas, notably in rebel-controlled areas, further complicate valuation.

Short term security needs will understandably be prioritized, but impacts on long term objectives should also be considered

Any eventual DRC-US agreement may therefore also be judged by Congolese stakeholders partly on whether it supports or undermines these ambitions. This is complicated by the possibility that a DRC-U.S. deal could involve Rwanda. One report suggests an eventual deal could involve “the creation of an industrial zone in Congo that would export processed metals via its neighbors,” while others indicate that Kigali sees negotiations “as an opportunity to legitimize access to Congolese resources and attract investment to expand its own existing metals processing.” The latter outcome could face criticism that negotiations prioritize short-term political survival of the governing coalition over the country’s long-term development goals.

Conclusion

The new context of state-to-state mining agreements may reshape what a “good deal” means for mineral-producing counties. As the DRC and others consider such arrangements—especially minerals-for-security deals—lessons from Ukraine and earlier resource-for-infrastructure deals can offer valuable guidance.

Given the polarized geopolitical context in which these deals are being negotiated, producer countries can benefit from maintaining strategic neutrality as much as possible. This is important for countries like the DRC to safeguard sovereignty and retain control over policy- making and the national development trajectory.

Ultimately, any deal will be judged on its implementation and impact. Transparent and measurable implementation will be essential to ensure benefits reach the population.

Introduction

In recent years, resource-rich countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have played a pivotal role in global energy markets, mainly due to their abundance of oil and natural gas reserves. This has driven the economic growth of resource-rich MENA countries and established them, particularly the Gulf states, as key producers in the global energy supply chain, shaping international energy dependencies and market dynamics. With increasing pressure to put an end to the catastrophic effects of climate change, countries across the globe have been drafting strategies and plans to transition away from fossil fuel production and consumption towards green alternatives. The momentum of the energy transition has raised legitimate questions in the MENA region—especially for the countries which are the main producers of fossil fuels, whose economies depend on this energy. These concerns center around how post-oil economies will affect the future of MENA’s societies and whether governments in the region will still have a role to play in a future less dependent on fossil fuels.

This briefing examines the potential of resource-rich countries in the MENA to capitalize on their natural resources and strategic placement to lead in renewable and green energies. It explores the possible benefits for MENA countries, highlights the importance of regional cooperation, and provides recommendations for achieving sustainable energy leadership in the coming decades. 

MENA at the crossroads of the energy transition

The MENA region’s impact on global energy markets is underscored by its substantial contribution to global oil and gas production. As shown in Table 1, five MENA countries—Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) —rank among the top ten oil producers worldwide, collectively supplying approximately 26 percent of the world’s oil.

Table 1: Top ten oil-producing countries in 2023

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=709&t=6.

Similarly, as shown in Table 2, four MENA countries—Algeria, Iran, Qatar and Saudi Arabia—rank among the top ten natural gas producers, collectively producing around 16 percent of the global natural gas supply.

Table 2: Top ten natural-gas producing countries in 2023

Source: Energy Institute, https://www.energyinst.org/statistical-review.

The global energy transition from hydrocarbons to renewable energy sources aims to combat climate change and reduce emissions, and it is redefining traditional economic and energy paradigms. Amid this shift, the MENA region stands at a crossroads. Resource-rich MENA nations face a choice: they can either lose the economic power they have held for many years, or seize the golden opportunity to emerge as global leaders in the era of clean energy. Nevertheless, this transition also brings about institutional, organizational, and financial challenges that governments in the region need to address. MENA countries must explore pathways to diversify their energy sectors in order to maintain economic growth and remain competitive in an evolving global energy market. However, governments of resource-rich countries do not have to view the energy transition as a complete shift away from hydrocarbons. Many are adopting policies where both hydrocarbons and renewables contribute to reducing emissions and enhancing energy security.

A win-win scenario for the MENA region

According to the governments of the region, MENA countries can uniquely benefit from a win-win scenario in the energy transition. By leveraging its dual strengths in both hydrocarbons and renewables potentials, the MENA region can drive economic resilience and growth. Its competitive advantage derives from three key factors:

1. Dual resource advantage: The MENA region is endowed with a dual foundation in hydrocarbons and renewable energy potential, particularly solar and wind, thus giving it a natural advantage in adapting to the global energy transition. According to the World Bank, 22–26 percent of solar energy is concentrated in the MENA region, allowing it to produce at least half of global electricity needs. Moreover, each unit invested in solar energy is expected to reduce emissions by twice as much as a similar investment in Europe or North America. The region also has abundant unused land that is well suited for large-scale solar farms as well as having untapped potential for wind energy. Large-scale wind projects can be carried out in key locations, such as Morocco’s Atlantic coast, the Gulf of Suez in Egypt, as well as north-western deserts in Saudi Arabia and southern Oman. There are generally fewer challenges in implementing these projects than in Europe or North America, where obtaining permits can be more time-consuming and projects tend to face stronger resistance from local communities. Capitalizing on wind and solar energy could enable the MENA region to also become a hub for green hydrogen production, something that is a high energy transition priority for many governments.
2. Balanced economic transition: For resource-rich producing countries, the global energy transition does not imply an immediate shift from hydrocarbons to renewables. Rather, it involves a balanced approach, allowing MENA countries to maintain economic stability through hydrocarbon exports while developing their renewable energy sectors.
3. Competitive production in energy-intensive sectors and strategic export advantage: The MENA region could take advantage of its access to low-cost and renewable-based energy to support energy-intensive industries, such as metals and chemicals, thus producing goods with low emissions. It could then export these goods to nearby regions, such as Europe, to transform them into final products. As such, the MENA region would be an attractive production hub for global markets as well as a reliable supplier in the green energy economy.

Regional cooperation: The backbone of MENA’s energy transition

Regional cooperation could be a driving force for the energy transition in the MENA region. Some have the land, while others have the financial capacities, workforce, infrastructure, or political leverage. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have been using the hydrocarbons sector and their financial capacities to advance their clean energy transition plans. Other countries, such as Morocco, have been able to attract investment for their projects through gaining knowledge and expertise to negotiate with financial institutions with complex standards. Others, such as Egypt, are attracting investment by catering to the needs of the global north, especially the European Union.

Several energy collaborations and infrastructure projects already exist in the MENA region, showcasing the potential for broader cooperation. These are projects related to hydrogen, renewable energy, electricity and grid interconnectors.

Hydrogen projects

1. Saudi Arabia’s green hydrogen initiative: Saudi Arabia is leading the development of the largest utility-scale green hydrogen project globally, set to begin operations in 2026 in Neom. The facility is projected to generate 600 tons of clean hydrogen per day and 1.2 million tons of green ammonia annually. The majority of this is intended for export, with transportation routes to include shipment via the Red Sea, pipelines through Egypt, and overland pathways to neighboring countries. This project is expected to reduce carbon emissions by 5 million metric tons annually, showcasing Saudi Arabia’s commitment to sustainable energy.
2. Egypt’s hydrogen agreements: At COP27, Egypt advanced its ambition to become a regional hydrogen hub by signing eight memorandums of understanding. These agreements include plans for an $8 billion hydrogen plant in the Suez Canal Economic Zone.
3. Morocco’s hydrogen roadmap: Morocco aims to establish a thriving hydrogen market, targeting a local demand of 4 TWh and exports of 10 TWh by 2030. This plan requires the development of 6 GW of new renewable energy capacity to support its ambitious goals.
4. Hydrogen pipelines and infrastructure: Proposals are being explored to establish a network of hydrogen pipelines connecting Israel, Jordan, Oman and the UAE. These pipelines could facilitate collaboration among these countries, leveraging existing natural gas infrastructure to transport hydrogen to regional and global markets.

Renewable energy projects

1. Saudi Arabia’s renewable energy in Neom: Saudi Arabia aims to produce 4 GW of renewable energy, with 3 GW allocated specifically to power its green hydrogen plant in Neom, demonstrating its commitment to integrating renewable energy into its projects.
2. Project prosperity: At COP27, Israel, Jordan and the UAE agreed on a water-energy swap initiative. This project includes the construction of a 600 MW solar PV plant in Jordan, which will supply electricity to Israel in return for desalinated water. Developed by Masdar, a UAE state-owned company, this collaboration underscores the advantages of regional cooperation in addressing energy and water challenges.
3. Egypt’s renewable energy advancements: Egypt is rapidly increasing its renewable energy capacity through large-scale solar PV projects. A notable example is the Benban Solar Park in Aswan, which has a capacity of 1,650 MW and reflects Egypt’s dedication to clean energy development.
4. Renewable energy potential in conflict-affected areas: The Sinai Peninsula in Egypt and the West Bank possess considerable potential for renewable energy projects. However, significant political and security barriers must be resolved to unlock these opportunities.

Electricity grids

1. GCC grid: The GCC operates a reliable electricity grid for emergency and peak-load scenarios.
2. Mashreq grid: The Mashreq grid connects countries such as Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, the Palestinian territories, Syria, and Turkey, though it has been less effective than other regional grids.
3. Maghreb grid: North African countries such as Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia use this grid for electricity trade.
4. Egypt-Saudi Arabia interconnector: The Egypt-Saudi interconnector project aims to enhance electricity trade between the two countries, with plans for significant capacity expansions.
5. Regional grid interconnection: Projects such as Israel-Jordan connections (as part of Project Prosperity) and Egypt-Cyprus-Greece interconnectors are under way, aiming to link MENA grids with Europe for better energy integration.

By cooperating, MENA countries can create a connected energy infrastructure that enhances regional competitiveness and facilitates access to global markets. Regional cooperation also enables the strategic placement of renewable energy stations across diverse areas, allowing for more efficient resource use. A well-connected or unified market would attract foreign investment more effectively, transforming natural resources into economic opportunities and solidifying the region’s position in the global green economy.

MENA countries are richly endowed with renewable resources and are deploying energy projects at varying paces under diverse policy frameworks. While many of these projects depend on imported technologies, such as solar PV panels, countries like Morocco and Tunisia have begun integrating elements of renewable technology value chains locally. Expanding this integration at a regional level presents a significant opportunity for collaboration across the MENA region. By adopting a coordinated approach, countries can leverage regional expertise in industries such as metals, mechanics, and electronics to develop complementary links in renewable technology value chains.

A strategy based on regional integration would not only create a larger market for renewable technologies, but also encourage manufacturers to scale operations and foster the creation of new businesses. Healthy competition among manufacturers in different countries could further drive productivity, innovation, and resilience against global competition. Additionally, a regionally integrated approach could optimize supply chains by reducing transportation distances, lowering carbon emissions, and improving overall efficiency. Such efforts would not only strengthen the renewable energy sector but also position the MENA region as a leader in the global energy transition.

The private sector: A catalyst in MENA’s energy future

In the MENA region, the energy sector—that is mainly electricity companies and those in oil and gas production—has generally been dominated by government-led investments. However, the need for private sector involvement in the energy transition is becoming increasingly apparent. Governments alone cannot shoulder the financial burden of meeting the region’s growing energy demands, especially as populations expand and economies industrialize. Most governments plan to replace the local energy needs from fossil-based fuels to clean energy, and this requires not only public investments in renewable projects but also a more active role for private companies that will need financing from different public and private sources.

Despite its potential, the private sector in the MENA region faces several challenges in contributing to the renewable energy transition. One of the primary obstacles is the capital-intensive nature of renewable energy projects, which requires developers to secure financing from banks or other financial institutions at the best prices and terms. Additionally, suppliers and contractors face significant pressure to deliver projects at the lowest possible cost while meeting stringent specifications, further complicating the process.

The overwhelming demand for renewable energy infrastructure has also created intense competition for supply chains, natural resources, and construction contractors, as the volume of demand exceeds the available supply on all levels. Companies like the Saudi and the Emirati Masdar have demonstrated global competitiveness by securing projects in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and South Africa. However, even these industry leaders face significant challenges—including navigating strained supply chains and securing favorable financing—as nations worldwide accelerate their renewable energy agendas. The broader market continues to struggle with establishing institutional frameworks and implementing effective risk-mitigation mechanisms to support project financing and attract global capital. Addressing these issues requires governments to prioritize investments in regional infrastructure and create environments that encourage private-sector participation. No single country’s resources are sufficient to meet the ambitious targets alone.

A key strategy to incentivize private-sector participation in the energy transition is for governments to encourage partnerships between small businesses and established companies. These collaborations enable smaller firms to gain expertise, thus equipping them to operate independently in the renewable sector. Governments can also play a critical role by committing to long-term purchase agreements for the produced energy, providing investment security and reducing risks for investors. For example, companies like ACWA Power and Masdar have benefited from such frameworks, enabling them to secure competitive financing and deliver large-scale renewable energy projects within and beyond the MENA region. This highlights the importance of creating regulatory environments that encourage private sector participation.

Establishing frameworks that attract global capital is equally important, as it ensures the scalability of projects beyond the capacity of domestic resources. Government resources can serve as seed funding to attract larger private investments, both domestically and internationally. Moreover, creating a regulatory and legal environment that protects and encourages investment—whether from local or foreign entities—is essential. MENA governments should also prioritize cross-border collaborations and public-private partnerships to establish an institutional framework that fosters private-sector growth and regional integration. Cross-border initiatives involving companies like ACWA Power and Masdar show how regional cooperation can amplify the impact of renewable-energy investments. These companies have initiated projects that not only strengthen local energy infrastructure, but also connect MENA markets to global energy systems. Combined with focused investments in regional infrastructure, these strategies can significantly enhance the region’s capacity to meet its ambitious renewable energy targets.

Recommendations for strengthening collaboration on MENA’s energy transition framework

To be established as a pioneer and leader in renewable energy—and to be able to produce enough green energy to suffice local demands and export the excess—governments in the MENA region should undertake several strategic actions to move toward complementarity, integration, collaboration, and exchange:

1. Develop energy infrastructure and regional connectivity: MENA governments should prioritize policies that enhance green infrastructure and establish connections with neighboring countries. Establishing a reliable and integrated electricity network would support the efficient distribution of renewable energy across the region, providing ease of access and strengthening energy security.
2. Maintain low-cost and high-reliability hydrocarbon electricity: Amid the transition to renewable energy, MENA governments should capitalize on their existing hydrocarbon resources to reliably produce electricity at a low cost. In this way, they can retain economic stability and allocate hydrocarbon revenues to fund projects based on renewable energy.
3. Encourage energy-intensive industries: MENA governments should attract industries that rely heavily on energy to transform their industries by focusing on clean electricity and green hydrogen. Providing low-emission products could transform the region into a competitive renewable production hub.
4. Invest in research and development: Investment in research and development is crucial to exploring innovative uses for clean energy. Governments can advance the application of renewable energy in sectors like green agriculture, for example, by investing in cutting-edge research and development.
5. Enhance human capacity: MENA governments should develop the local expertise in both traditional and renewable energy sectors by equipping the workforce with the necessary skills. For example, governments could invest in training programs that upgrade the skills of those working in the oil and gas sector to meet the demands of a renewable-focused economy.
6. Create a favorable investment environment: MENA countries should establish a favorable organizational and legal framework, which will help attract local and foreign investment. Government policies that protect investments and reduce risks will stimulate private-sector participation in renewable energy projects. Government funding should serve solely as seed capital in order to stimulate larger investments.
7. Develop a regional roadmap for the energy transition: MENA countries should collaborate on a comprehensive regional roadmap, similar in structure to the European Green Deal, to guide them through the energy transition. The MENA Green Dealshould outline infrastructure needs, such as integrated electricity connections, and establish organizational and legal frameworks to support renewable energy development. Moreover, it should define the role of the private sector and provide incentives for investment in renewables, critical minerals, and research and development. 

References

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Ezrahi, A. (2024). An Energy and Sustainability Road Map for the Middle East. Atlantic Council. Retrieved from https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/an-energy-and-sustainability-road-map-for-the-middle-east/#specific-initiatives.

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