Several projects signed long-term contracts with buyers, obtained key permits and approvals, and announced fresh timelines. The investors behind LNG projects on the Pacific Coast claim the war with Iran has raised interest from foreign customers, as Asia and Europe seek replacements for stranded Middle Eastern LNG.  

In Baja California, in July, Sempra’s ECA LNG shipped its first cargo to Asia, making it Mexico’s second operational LNG export plant and the first on the Pacific Coast. In March, however, Sempra also canceled the Vista Pacífico LNG project in Sinaloa, highlighting uncertainties around LNG both in Mexico and globally.  

In earlier posts, we questioned how realistic Mexican LNG re-exports are and whether their benefits will exceed the costs. But more than halfway through 2026, answers are scarce and LNG remains a large blank spot in Mexico’s energy planning and policies. The government has yet to explain how these projects will impact the country’s energy security, public finances, communities, or goals for clean energy and climate.  

This opacity extends to individual projects. When Amigo LNG’s environmental impact statement (MIA) appeared online, it was heavily redacted. The first operating export terminal in Mexico, New Fortress Energy’s Altamira FLNG 1, likewise discloses limited information about its finances and operations.

Without more transparency, Mexico will not have the sort of open, evidence-based debate that LNG re-exports deserve. 

Project developers and government agencies need to publish information that answers these basic questions: 

Will LNG projects consume gas that Mexico needs for its own energy? 

NRGI analysis shows how Mexico’s deep dependence on gas risks energy shortages. Yet key data needed to assess those risks are either outdated or not publicly available. 

Until recently, record-setting US production and a wave of new liquefaction projects were creating a glut of LNG. However, the disruption of LNG exports through the Strait of Hormuz has tightened global gas markets, with nearly 20% of global LNG supply temporarily affected. 

U.S. firms have rushed to fill the gap, making supply conditions and competition much tighter than previously anticipated. Meanwhile, the U.S.’s own demand for gas, mainly for electricity generation, is also soaring. 

If companies re-export US-based gas through Mexico, this will create even more competing demand. A recent analysis found that the original plans of Amigo LNG could lead to gas shortages at four Sonoran power plants because the existing pipeline network cannot transport enough gas to supply both the power plants and Amigo. Given these risks: 

• Mexico's Ministry of Energy (Sener) should regularly update and improve the System of Energy Information (SIE), including publicly accessible and disaggregated data on gas imports, exports, consumption, and infrastructure use. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) and the Brazilian ANP (Agencia Nacional del Petróleo, Gas Natural y Biocombustibles) are examples of good practice. The public should be able to identify gas importers, LNG exporters, which sectors consume it, and how volumes move through Mexico’s pipeline network.
• LNG developers should publish MIAs that describe in detail how their projects would affect gas availability. The disclosures should show how much gas a project will consume, where it will come from, and whether sufficient gas and pipeline capacity will remain available for domestic users.  
• Sener should include scenarios in the Natural Gas Outlook assessing how LNG exports will impact gas demand, imports, infrastructure use, and energy security. 

How will re-exports affect the prices Mexico pays for gas and gas-derived products? 

U.S. government studies have warned that more LNG exports, whether from the U.S. or Mexico, could make gas and electricity prices higher on both sides of the border. 

The effects could intensify during periods of high demand (e.g. in winter) or supply disruptions. This has already happened in parts of the U.S., where dysfunction in LNG markets left consumers paying more for energy. 

Higher gas prices in Texas or increased volatility will inevitably expose Mexico to higher power generation costs. They could also hike prices for fertilizers, petrochemicals, cement, steel, paper, plastics, glass, and processed food. As such:

• Sener should assess and disclose the risk of gas price increases for the different sectors that use gas. Within the PLADESE (Plan de Desarrollo del Sector Eléctrico), Sener already tracks gas price assumptions/trends to address the forecasted demand, but it should explicitly assess the impacts of LNG exports on gas prices, generation costs and electricity prices across different regions of the country, as these impacts are likely to vary regionally.
• Sener should use the Natural Gas Outlook and regional gas price data to assess how LNG exports could affect gas prices for industry and other consumers. The analysis should estimate impacts across sectors and regions and be updated regularly as LNG projects move forward. 

Who will build and control the pipelines that feed LNG plants? 

While some projects will use existing state-owned pipelines, others will require new infrastructure worth billions. The National Center for Natural Gas Control (CENAGAS), which operates significant gas pipeline infrastructure, wants to partner with private companies on a new line in Sonora to feed an LNG export project, as part of its costly new pipeline modernization plan. Key details remain unclear, however, and to clear this up: 

• CENAGAS should explain the legal and commercial structure of any new pipeline linked to LNG exports. The public needs to know who will own, build, operate, finance, and control the lines, why they are needed, and whether domestic users will have guaranteed access.
• Project developers should disclose details about pipelines that affect the public interest. These include route, capacity, interconnections, transportation agreements, reserved capacity, and any commitments involving public infrastructure.
• Sener should include LNG-linked pipeline projects in the PLADESHi (Plan de Desarrollo del Sector Hidrocarburos) and explain how these projects fit within Mexico’s broader gas strategy. This includes which projects would primarily serve domestic demand versus exports and how domestic supply will be guaranteed.

What revenue will the government earn? 

Officials and project developers are promoting LNG re-exports as major investments, yet no one has explained in depth how they will benefit the state financially and how much value will remain in Mexico. To remedy this: 

• Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (SCHP), in coordination with the relevant agencies, should clearly explain the fiscal framework applicable to LNG re-export projects. At a minimum, this should include:  

- The types of taxes, fees and other payments that companies are required to make—for instance, corporate income (ISR) and payroll taxes, port and gas processing dues, and one-time fees for permits and customs.

- The legal basis for each obligation (law, regulation, contract) and the agency responsible for collecting them.

- Any incentives, exemptions or subsidies that projects or their developers will receive.  

- How the government will benefit from the windfall profits projects earn when prices are high.  

• Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) should disclose both its actual earnings and commercial rationale for participating in LNG projects. This should include revenues from gas supply, transportation services, infrastructure use, equity participation, or any other commercial arrangement linked to LNG projects.  
• Sener should establish a public mechanism to monitor LNG-related revenues over time. Whether through the federal budget process, the Cuenta Pública, or project-level reporting, the public should be able to track what the government and state-owned enterprises actually earn from LNG re-exports once projects begin operating. 

What jobs and other socioeconomic benefits will re-exports bring?

The executive branch has touted LNG’s job creation potential without saying how many jobs, or what kind. Project developers make similar claims, yet gas liquefaction plants generally require few workers. Amigo LNG, for instance, says it expects to create 6,000 direct jobs during construction and about 1,000 once operations start. And what about links to the broader economy such as local procurement, workforce training, or infrastructure improvements?  

• Sener should require LNG developers to quantify and publish standardized indicators on jobs and other socioeconomic benefits through their Social Impact Assessment (MISSE) and annual social-management reports. These should include construction and permanent jobs, local procurement, workforce training, social investment, and other promised benefits, allowing the public to compare commitments with actual outcomes.
• Sener should make MISSE follow-up reports publicly available in a searchable format. The law already requires annual reporting on social-management commitments and shared social benefits; the public should be able to track results over time.
• The ENTE (Estrategia Nacional de Transición Energética) and PROSENER (Programa Sectorial de Energía) should explain how LNG re-exports serve the country’s bigger energy and developmental goals. They should clarify whether these projects are expected to support regional employment, local supply chains, industrial development, or other public-policy objectives, and how success will be measured. 

Disclosures like these will make it clearer how the costs and likely benefits of LNG re-exports will be shared. Improving public disclosure of data on both gas imports and LNG exports would strengthen evidence-based policy-making and support more informed decisions. 

Timely, comprehensive, and publicly accessible information about the energy sector, and LNG in particular, has become even more important as the Mexican transparency framework has changed. Mexico is not making effective use of international initiatives like the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the Open Government Partnership (OGP).

Talia Contreras Tapia is Mexico program officer for NRGI. Diego Rivera Rivota is a senior research associate at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy. Aaron Sayne is NRGI’s lead for sustainable energy supply. 

On 30 June and 1 July, Senegal's Ministry of Energy and Petroleum, EITI Senegal and NRGI will bring together government, parliament, civil society, affected communities, the private sector and international partners in Dakar for the third National Forum on Extractive Sector Governance. The forum comes at a defining moment in the country's development: Senegal is now an oil and gas producer. At the same time, the country faces the challenge of developing its oil and gas resources while advancing its energy transition and long-term development goals.

Stakeholders from across the sector will meet to discuss the priorities that should shape this next phase. The governance choices made today will determine whether Senegal's natural resources translate into quality public services, stronger fiscal resilience and a just energy transition that supports sustainable and inclusive development. Through its Senegal Vision 2050 agenda, the country aims to turn extractive revenues into sustainable public investment, reduce its vulnerability to commodity price cycles and build accountable institutions that endure beyond political transitions. The forum provides an opportunity to advance that conversation.

Senegal has been producing oil since June 2024 and liquefied natural gas since February 2025. The country's legal framework is now in place, including a hydrocarbons revenue management law, parliamentary oversight mechanisms and stronger transparency requirements. But the context in which those rules must now operate has changed significantly. Public debt, revised to 132 percent of GDP by the Court of Auditors, has reduced the country's fiscal room for maneuver. PETROSEN has taken on a larger operational role in developing the country's gas projects, while the government has launched a process to review oil, gas and mining contracts. At the same time, Senegal must balance the development of its gas resources with expanding renewable energy and meeting its climate commitments.

At a time of fiscal pressure and high public expectations, what distinguishes a new producer is not just the size of its resource base. It is the strength of its governance institutions and their ability to ensure transparent, effective and equitable management of natural resources over the long term. Those are precisely the questions that stakeholders will address in Dakar.

NRGI has worked in resource-rich countries for more than 20 years, including five years of engagement in Senegal. Together with public institutions, EITI Senegal, civil society, affected communities and other partners, NRGI has contributed to several of the reforms and debates that have shaped this period, from strengthening the legal framework for extractive revenues to supporting the establishment of the government's grievance mechanism in the hydrocarbons sector, as well as advancing public debate on methane emissions, supporting affected communities and contributing to the creation of the Platform of Civil Society Actors for a Just Energy Transition (PACTEJ). A more detailed review of these five years of work will be published soon.

An agenda for the next phase

The National Forum is not an endpoint. It is a starting point for the next phase of Senegal’s resource governance, offering a chance not only to take stock of progress and identify remaining gaps, but to set clear priorities and build momentum for the work ahead. Discussions will focus on revenue management, contract transparency, PETROSEN's role, the trade-offs between hydrocarbon development and the energy transition, critical minerals and the participation of communities and local authorities. These are complex questions that will require difficult choices and sustained collaboration across government, civil society, industry and communities.

The discussions in Dakar matter beyond Senegal. Since 2021, the country has shown that a well-designed governance framework can be brought to life through sustained dialogue, capacity development and evidence-based approaches, resulting in tangible gains in transparency and accountability. The next phase will test whether those rules can be put into practice as Senegal seeks to develop its natural resources, protect its communities and build a more sustainable, resilient and inclusive energy future. Ultimately, the country's future will be defined not only by production, but by whether Senegal can turn its natural resources into lasting benefits for its people. The National Forum is an opportunity to help shape that next chapter.

The authors thank Amir Shafaie and Papa Daouda Diene for their contributions.

Oxfam, NRGI and RJN's new brief evaluates mining company performance on contract disclosure and shares recommendations for improvements.

In September 2021, International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) member companies made a commitment to publish their mineral development contracts with governments. This was an important step in the decades long shift toward contract transparency as an established global norm.

Four years later, this brief reflects on lessons learned from the implementation of the commitment as three major policy processes—the creation of the Consolidated Mining Standard Initiative (CMSI), the revision of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) Sustainability Framework and the upcoming 2026 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) Global Conference—are poised to shape approaches to contract transparency for the years to come.

The rise of contract transparency

Over the past two decades, contract disclosure has shifted from a niche reform to an expectation backed by governments, investors, companies and civil society.

Contracts governing oil, gas and mining projects outline critical obligations on taxes, environmental management, community benefits, and more. Publishing these agreements builds trust, reduces corruption risks, and increases stability. Over the past two decades, contract disclosure has shifted from a niche reform to an expectation backed by governments, investors, companies and civil society.

Members of ICMM helped accelerate this shift by engaging in policy dialogue and through early statements of support. Then in 2021, ICMM made a high-profile commitment: its member companies would begin publishing their mineral development contracts with governments.

The ICMM commitment—four years on

As part of our ongoing efforts to support ICMM members to publish contracts, we carried out a review to determine the extent that the commitment had led to public disclosure of contracts by ICMM companies.  We found that eight of 24 ICMM companies now publish contracts—up from just three before the commitment. Continued disclosures by Orano, Rio Tinto and South32; and new disclosures by Glencore, Hydro, Newmont, MMG and Sibanye-Stillwater, reflect meaningful momentum. What is more is that each of these companies is publishing many documents that are not required to be made public under the commitment, most notably contracts agreed before 2021.

Key lessons to accelerate progress

1. Encouragements alone do rarely lead to consistent uptake
   Companies that did not disclose largely interpreted the requirement as not applying to their contracts. Standards like the CMSI and IFC can strengthen uptake by turning encouragements into requirements. If they are unable to do this they should set clear pathways for companies to achieve encouraged practices.
2. Retroactive disclosure is possible
   Most disclosed contracts were older, voluntary releases—challenging the idea that pre-2021 agreements must remain outside contract transparency requirements.
3. Companies need clearer, harmonized guidance
   ICMM’s new guidance is useful but differs in some areas from EITI practice, particularly around its narrow definition of “contracts” and exclusion of agreements with Indigenous Peoples and communities. Aligning standards with the latest EITI guidance note would ensure a harmonized approach to contract transparency across standards.
4. More detailed assurance will support meaningful transparency
   Current ICMM assurance processes do not provide sufficient information for stakeholders to assess whether commitments are being met. Requiring more thorough assurance reports, particularly on which contracts were published and how, and why other contracts were not required to be made public, would improve accountability and confidence around contract transparency standards.

A moment of opportunity

With the CMSI nearing finalization, the IFC updating its Sustainability Framework and EITI preparing for its 2026 Global Conference, the coming year offers rare chances to lock in stronger requirements, clearer guidance and more accountable disclosure systems.

ICMM’s contract transparency commitment was an important milestone. The next phase is ensuring that implementation aligns with ambition. Stronger standards across CMSI, IFC and EITI can help ensure that contract disclosure becomes routine practice, supporting trust, accountability and better governance at a time when global demand for minerals is rapidly increasing.

President Claudia Sheinbaum has pledged that Mexico will reach net-zero emissions by 2050. To achieve this, the country’s updated NDC must go beyond technical greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction targets. It should provide a clear roadmap that links climate action to real improvements in people’s lives, including more stable jobs, stronger communities, and a future-ready economy.

In this context, Pemex must play a central role. The energy sector accounts for 64% of the country’s GHG emissions, and Pemex is responsible for 95% of hydrocarbon production and the bulk of associated infrastructure. In Mexico, to talk about hydrocarbons is essentially to talk about Pemex.

Why Pemex?

International experience shows that state-owned oil companies are still unprepared for the challenges of the energy transition, including declining oil demand. Governments have a decisive role to play. By setting clear policy signals and creating financing mechanisms, they can help these companies shift toward new business models.

The Mexican state holds a particularly strong influence over Pemex, given the company’s heavy reliance on government support. In 2025 and 2026 alone, Pemex faces debt maturities of US$24 billion, while the proposed 2026 budget allocates MXN 263.5 billion for debt servicing. That figure is double the 2025 allocation, equivalent to half of the resources earmarked for senior citizens’ pensions and six times the proposed environmental budget.

A stronger, more decisive commitment from Pemex would send a powerful signal that Mexico is willing to align its state-owned company with its decarbonization and just transition goals. Such a step would not only reinforce national climate ambition but also build confidence among the international community, the financial sector and the public.

Integrating Pemex into Mexico’s NDC 3.0: three priorities

1. Reduce methane emissions

Methane is 25 to 80 times more potent than CO₂ and poses serious health risks to communities living near oil facilities. Between 2012 and 2021, Pemex’s largest emission increases came from this gas.

Between 2021 and 2024, Pemex’s methane emissions fell by 29 percent. The company launched its first sustainability plan and voiced its commitment to the World Bank’s Zero Routine Flaring by 2030 initiative. However, Pemex’s methane output remains higher than a decade ago and above that of its international peers. Cutting these emissions is both urgent and strategic, as proven technological solutions exist and, in many cases, are cost-effective. The updated NDC offers the right framework for Pemex to adopt absolute, phased reduction targets, improve measurement and transparency, and join the Oil & Gas Methane Partnership (OGMP 2.0). Doing so would position Mexico as a global leader in methane mitigation.

2. Manage transition risks

Pemex ranks 11th among 58 state-owned oil companies most exposed to transition risks, according to a recent NRGI analysis. Up to US$10 billion in assets could become uneconomic under the International Energy Agency’s Announced Pledges Scenario, posing major risks for public revenues, jobs, and communities tied to the oil industry.

Mexico's updated NDC should respond by promoting transparent risk assessments, redirecting investments toward lower-carbon, higher-return projects, encouraging business diversification, and fostering joint ventures with the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE). It should also establish stronger corporate governance mechanisms under the Ministry of Energy’s (SENER) oversight to ensure planning is consistent with sustainability goals.

3. Just transition plans for oil-producing regions

States such as Campeche and Tabasco, heavily dependent on oil revenues, are already experiencing the impacts of declining production. To ensure no one is left behind, Mexico’s NDC should include just transition plans and the responsible decommissioning of infrastructure. This roadmap should prioritize economic diversification, workforce retraining, tailored educational programs, and greater transparency on environmental and health impacts.

These measures are in line with the outcomes of Mexico’s Local Conference of Youth proposals (2025 LCOY) and the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources’ (SEMARNAT) agenda for NDC 3.0, can foster a transition that delivers tangible benefits to the communities most dependent on oil.

Pemex at the center of Mexico’s climate action

The NDC gives Mexico a critical chance to raise its climate ambition, demonstrate international leadership, and put Pemex on a sustainable path. Explicitly including the company would send a clear signal of commitment to a just and orderly transition, in step with the global call to move beyond fossil fuels.

For decades, Pemex has been at the center of Mexico’s energy policy. It must now be at the heart of its climate response. This is the moment to show that commitment and accelerate progress toward net-zero emissions by 2050, building a more equitable, transparent future that delivers for all Mexicans.