Mexico as a “Re-Exporter” of U.S. Gas: Time for Transparency

Several projects signed long-term contracts with buyers, obtained key permits and approvals, and announced fresh timelines. The investors behind LNG projects on the Pacific Coast claim the war with Iran has raised interest from foreign customers, as Asia and Europe seek replacements for stranded Middle Eastern LNG.  

In Baja California, in July, Sempra’s ECA LNG shipped its first cargo to Asia, making it Mexico’s second operational LNG export plant and the first on the Pacific Coast. In March, however, Sempra also canceled the Vista Pacífico LNG project in Sinaloa, highlighting uncertainties around LNG both in Mexico and globally.  

In earlier posts, we questioned how realistic Mexican LNG re-exports are and whether their benefits will exceed the costs. But more than halfway through 2026, answers are scarce and LNG remains a large blank spot in Mexico’s energy planning and policies. The government has yet to explain how these projects will impact the country’s energy security, public finances, communities, or goals for clean energy and climate.  

This opacity extends to individual projects. When Amigo LNG’s environmental impact statement (MIA) appeared online, it was heavily redacted. The first operating export terminal in Mexico, New Fortress Energy’s Altamira FLNG 1, likewise discloses limited information about its finances and operations.

Without more transparency, Mexico will not have the sort of open, evidence-based debate that LNG re-exports deserve. 

Project developers and government agencies need to publish information that answers these basic questions: 

Will LNG projects consume gas that Mexico needs for its own energy? 

NRGI analysis shows how Mexico’s deep dependence on gas risks energy shortages. Yet key data needed to assess those risks are either outdated or not publicly available. 

Until recently, record-setting US production and a wave of new liquefaction projects were creating a glut of LNG. However, the disruption of LNG exports through the Strait of Hormuz has tightened global gas markets, with nearly 20% of global LNG supply temporarily affected. 

U.S. firms have rushed to fill the gap, making supply conditions and competition much tighter than previously anticipated. Meanwhile, the U.S.’s own demand for gas, mainly for electricity generation, is also soaring. 

If companies re-export US-based gas through Mexico, this will create even more competing demand. A recent analysis found that the original plans of Amigo LNG could lead to gas shortages at four Sonoran power plants because the existing pipeline network cannot transport enough gas to supply both the power plants and Amigo. Given these risks: 

• Mexico's Ministry of Energy (Sener) should regularly update and improve the System of Energy Information (SIE), including publicly accessible and disaggregated data on gas imports, exports, consumption, and infrastructure use. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) and the Brazilian ANP (Agencia Nacional del Petróleo, Gas Natural y Biocombustibles) are examples of good practice. The public should be able to identify gas importers, LNG exporters, which sectors consume it, and how volumes move through Mexico’s pipeline network.
• LNG developers should publish MIAs that describe in detail how their projects would affect gas availability. The disclosures should show how much gas a project will consume, where it will come from, and whether sufficient gas and pipeline capacity will remain available for domestic users.  
• Sener should include scenarios in the Natural Gas Outlook assessing how LNG exports will impact gas demand, imports, infrastructure use, and energy security. 

How will re-exports affect the prices Mexico pays for gas and gas-derived products? 

U.S. government studies have warned that more LNG exports, whether from the U.S. or Mexico, could make gas and electricity prices higher on both sides of the border. 

The effects could intensify during periods of high demand (e.g. in winter) or supply disruptions. This has already happened in parts of the U.S., where dysfunction in LNG markets left consumers paying more for energy. 

Higher gas prices in Texas or increased volatility will inevitably expose Mexico to higher power generation costs. They could also hike prices for fertilizers, petrochemicals, cement, steel, paper, plastics, glass, and processed food. As such:

• Sener should assess and disclose the risk of gas price increases for the different sectors that use gas. Within the PLADESE (Plan de Desarrollo del Sector Eléctrico), Sener already tracks gas price assumptions/trends to address the forecasted demand, but it should explicitly assess the impacts of LNG exports on gas prices, generation costs and electricity prices across different regions of the country, as these impacts are likely to vary regionally.
• Sener should use the Natural Gas Outlook and regional gas price data to assess how LNG exports could affect gas prices for industry and other consumers. The analysis should estimate impacts across sectors and regions and be updated regularly as LNG projects move forward. 

Who will build and control the pipelines that feed LNG plants? 

While some projects will use existing state-owned pipelines, others will require new infrastructure worth billions. The National Center for Natural Gas Control (CENAGAS), which operates significant gas pipeline infrastructure, wants to partner with private companies on a new line in Sonora to feed an LNG export project, as part of its costly new pipeline modernization plan. Key details remain unclear, however, and to clear this up: 

• CENAGAS should explain the legal and commercial structure of any new pipeline linked to LNG exports. The public needs to know who will own, build, operate, finance, and control the lines, why they are needed, and whether domestic users will have guaranteed access.
• Project developers should disclose details about pipelines that affect the public interest. These include route, capacity, interconnections, transportation agreements, reserved capacity, and any commitments involving public infrastructure.
• Sener should include LNG-linked pipeline projects in the PLADESHi (Plan de Desarrollo del Sector Hidrocarburos) and explain how these projects fit within Mexico’s broader gas strategy. This includes which projects would primarily serve domestic demand versus exports and how domestic supply will be guaranteed.

What revenue will the government earn? 

Officials and project developers are promoting LNG re-exports as major investments, yet no one has explained in depth how they will benefit the state financially and how much value will remain in Mexico. To remedy this: 

• Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (SCHP), in coordination with the relevant agencies, should clearly explain the fiscal framework applicable to LNG re-export projects. At a minimum, this should include:  

- The types of taxes, fees and other payments that companies are required to make—for instance, corporate income (ISR) and payroll taxes, port and gas processing dues, and one-time fees for permits and customs.

- The legal basis for each obligation (law, regulation, contract) and the agency responsible for collecting them.

- Any incentives, exemptions or subsidies that projects or their developers will receive.  

- How the government will benefit from the windfall profits projects earn when prices are high.  

• Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) should disclose both its actual earnings and commercial rationale for participating in LNG projects. This should include revenues from gas supply, transportation services, infrastructure use, equity participation, or any other commercial arrangement linked to LNG projects.  
• Sener should establish a public mechanism to monitor LNG-related revenues over time. Whether through the federal budget process, the Cuenta Pública, or project-level reporting, the public should be able to track what the government and state-owned enterprises actually earn from LNG re-exports once projects begin operating. 

What jobs and other socioeconomic benefits will re-exports bring?

The executive branch has touted LNG’s job creation potential without saying how many jobs, or what kind. Project developers make similar claims, yet gas liquefaction plants generally require few workers. Amigo LNG, for instance, says it expects to create 6,000 direct jobs during construction and about 1,000 once operations start. And what about links to the broader economy such as local procurement, workforce training, or infrastructure improvements?  

• Sener should require LNG developers to quantify and publish standardized indicators on jobs and other socioeconomic benefits through their Social Impact Assessment (MISSE) and annual social-management reports. These should include construction and permanent jobs, local procurement, workforce training, social investment, and other promised benefits, allowing the public to compare commitments with actual outcomes.
• Sener should make MISSE follow-up reports publicly available in a searchable format. The law already requires annual reporting on social-management commitments and shared social benefits; the public should be able to track results over time.
• The ENTE (Estrategia Nacional de Transición Energética) and PROSENER (Programa Sectorial de Energía) should explain how LNG re-exports serve the country’s bigger energy and developmental goals. They should clarify whether these projects are expected to support regional employment, local supply chains, industrial development, or other public-policy objectives, and how success will be measured. 

Disclosures like these will make it clearer how the costs and likely benefits of LNG re-exports will be shared. Improving public disclosure of data on both gas imports and LNG exports would strengthen evidence-based policy-making and support more informed decisions. 

Timely, comprehensive, and publicly accessible information about the energy sector, and LNG in particular, has become even more important as the Mexican transparency framework has changed. Mexico is not making effective use of international initiatives like the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the Open Government Partnership (OGP).

Talia Contreras Tapia is Mexico program officer for NRGI. Diego Rivera Rivota is a senior research associate at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy. Aaron Sayne is NRGI’s lead for sustainable energy supply.